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On his second day as president, Barack Obama acted on a promise 
to close the detention facility that his predecessor opened in Guantána-
mo.  He created an inter-agency task force to advise him on the specifics 
of this process and to create future guidelines for the detention of terror-
ism suspects captured abroad.  He set a deadline on the accomplishment 
of this objective: one year.  Today we are two weeks away from the is-
suance of the inter-agency task force’s report, and media commentators 
tell us that almost no one expects that his goal of closing the facility in 
one year can be met.  Not meeting this self-imposed deadline will be por-
trayed by some, especially the superficial commentators who populate 
the Beltway world, as a failure by the Obama Administration.  But in 
fact, as we meet here today Attorney General Holder is announcing a se-
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ries of prosecutions that will go forward quickly, one group in federal 
court in New York and another before a military commission.  The 
framework of the Obama effort is quickly coming into shape. 
Today, I would like to invite a new look at Guantánamo.  And I’ll 
start by asking a simple question: can we really bring the Guantánamo 
debacle to a close without focusing careful attention on how it was set 
up, what went on there, and drawing some conclusions about the past?  I 
think the answer to that question is clearly “no.” Yet Barack Obama tells 
us we need to “look forwards, not backwards.”  This has been a regular 
response to calls for accountability stemming from the excesses of the 
Bush Administration’s war on terror namely, torture and the mistreat-
ment of prisoners, the operation of black sites and warrantless domestic 
surveillance.  This posture has been advised by his political counselors 
Rahm Emanuel and David Axelrod.  They believe that the President has 
an affirmative agenda to push through Washington, starting with man-
agement of the most severe economic crisis since the Great Depression, 
reform of a catastrophically inefficient healthcare system and so forth.  
The questions surrounding how the war on terror was managed in the 
past will, in the Emanuel-Axelrod view, only take attention away from 
the job at hand.  In the eyes of the school of practical politics, this is a 
perfectly reasonable perspective.  But it will not help us bring Guantá-
namo to closure.  
At present, the loudest voice opposing the President’s call to “look 
forwards” is the same one which opposes the plan to close Guantánamo.  
It comes from Vice President Dick Cheney, supplemented by his daugh-
ter Liz, and a number of figures from the last administration associated 
with them. The Cheneys have even organized a lobbying entity called 
Keep America Safe, raised money from a Florida real estate mogul (who 
also, probably not coincidentally, chairs the Scooter Libby Defense 
Committee), and plan to run television commercials attacking the Obama 
Administration as weak on national defense because of its commitment 
to close Guantánamo. 
Significantly, the Cheneys call on us to look back at the last seven 
years, and they are very proud of the accomplishments during this period 
of time. They are proud of the use of “enhanced interrogation tech-
niques,” which they argue saved thousands of American lives. They are 
proud of Guantánamo, because it put an emphasis on intelligence gather-
ing rather than weak justice ideas and kept Americans safe from the 
“worst of the worst.”  They are also proud of the conduct of the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, which they believe achieved U.S. objectives.  They 
have also turned to a series of tactical steps to try to frustrate the Presi-
dent’s plans and have indeed succeeded.   
This crew disagreed throughout the Bush Administration that it 
would be unpatriotic to obstruct the President’s conduct of the war on 
terror by arguing against the strategies and plans that he formulated. 
Once the baton has passed, however, they have attempted to obstruct 
even the slightest deviation from their own calamitous course.  If Guan-
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tánamo is not closed by February 2010, and I consider that likely, then 
the number one reason for this is the relentless campaign of obstruction 
the Cheneys and their allies have launched. At its center is fear-
mongering designed to convince Americans that putting           Guantá-
namo detainees in a supermax prison (from which no one has ever es-
caped) and having them stand trial in a federal court would result in 
Americans being killed in their beds at night as they sleep.  This notion is 
so completely absurd that it should have provoked ridicule and laughter, 
but it did not. And that is a testament to the capacity of our broadcast 
media to absorb and disseminate utter absurdities.  Legislation to bar the 
transfer of Guantánamo prisoners to the continental United States was 
introduced, and more recently Senators Graham, Lieberman and McCain 
have put forward measures to stop the prosecution of Guantánamo detai-
nees in federal courts or the paroling or release of prisoners to the United 
States.  Only in the last week was the Obama Administration able to se-
cure sufficient authority to transfer prisoners to the United States to stand 
trial. 
Still, I agree with Vice President Cheney and disagree with       
President Obama on this point:  it is essential that we carefully consider 
what was done at Guantánamo and form some judgments about it.  In 
fact, we will not move forward without doing this. Attempting a histori-
cal judgment is a duty - in fact, an imperative.  We need to muster the 
tools of the historian to look at them.  We need to attempt, as best we 
can, to be detached in our judgments.  Our military colleagues call this 
process “lessons learned.”  Indeed, there is a great deal to be learned 
from our experience with Guantánamo.   
This process is particularly important for another reason: historical 
falsification is a powerful weapon that has been wielded repeatedly in the 
last hundred years to drive political discourse and shape destinies.  In an 
article published in the New York Times Magazine in 2004, Pulitzer 
Prize-winning journalist Ron Suskind quoted a high-ranking advisor to 
President Bush in these terms: “We’re an empire now, and when we act, 
we create our own reality.”  These remarks are widely credited to Presi-
dent Bush’s senior political advisor, the man dubbed his “brain,” Karl 
Rove.  What does it mean for a democratic society when a government 
seeks to “create its own reality? 
What does it mean to say a powerful government can “create its 
own reality?”  At the end of World War II, a number of the epoch’s most 
profound chroniclers, such as George Orwell, Hannah Arendt, Theodor 
W. Adorno and Victor Klemperer, looked back at the tumultuous period 
that had just ended. They found it had been marked by an extraordinary 
effort by great powers to “create their own reality,” an effort not really 
matched in prior human history.  This was done not only by domination 
of the sources of information, but also by a systematic rewriting of histo-
ry.  It was of course the hallmark of the totalitarian states of the left and 
right: Hitler’s Germany, Mussolini’s Italy, Tojo’s Japan, and Stalin’s So-
viet Union.  We should not, however, suppose that the noble Allies were 
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entirely immune from the temptation either.  To be sure, the essence of 
the Orwellian nightmare lies in the fear that this process of creating an 
independent reality would, propelled by the soaring        technologies of 
the information age, come to dominate even the         democracies of the 
West.  
Hannah Arendt wrote first about this phenomenon in her study, “On 
Totalitarianism.”  Later, in the age of the Pentagon Papers and Vietnam 
War, she realized that the political process of creating a pliant reality was 
gaining a hold in America’s own culture.  It was, she noted, a “crisis of 
the republic,” though one, she thought, America’s institutions were 
strong enough to cope with.  That is a core observation of her vital essay, 
“Lying and Politics.”  Political lies, she reminds us, have been around as 
long as there have been politicians.  Indeed, the art of lying is an ac-
cepted part of politics and is viewed as matter of tradecraft, which begs 
the following question: what is so menacing about political lying in the 
world that emerged from World War II?   
Arendt makes a number of observations that seem very well suited 
to the world we find ourselves in now, the world of Rupert Murdoch and 
cable news.  The modern political liar will start with a claim that there is 
no objective truth, but only subjective truth: liberal truth or conservative 
truth, red truth or blue truth, Democratic truth or Republican truth.  This 
is the first step that leads to the destruction of historical objectivity. The 
second step is the development of an at least somewhat paradoxical rela-
tionship to history.  In fact the modern political liar is history-obsessed.  
He needs to remake it to vindicate himself and to move things in the di-
rection he seeks; he recognizes the power of historical memory. To use 
Orwell’s simple, powerful formulation: “He who controls the present, 
controls the past. He who controls the past controls the future.” Why 
does Stalin have to airbrush Trotsky from Soviet history? Or to take the 
example of the superlative Oscar-winning film, “The Lives of Others,” 
why was it essential for East Germany to suppress statistical data about 
suicides or to deny the existence of unemployment? These facts are in-
consistent with the state’s official historical narrative. Hence they cannot 
be. The third step that Arendt envisions is that the modern political liar 
will inevitably use his power to try to turn his lies into reality. Arendt 
considers this potentially the most horrifying of her theses about political 
lying.  She asks us to consider whether this may not literally fuel mur-
ders.  These are all aspects of modern political lies, the new, far more vi-
rulent form of political lying that challenges our world.   
For Arendt, this sort of lie is nothing less than a challenge to the 
promise of democratic government.  There are many examples, but one 
can suffice here.  As the Great War ended and a real democracy was in-
troduced in Germany, the nation’s powerful and fundamentally anti-
democratic conservative elements struck back, and they wielded history 
as their essential weapon.  Around the world, World War I was seen as 
the consequence of German acts of provocation, starting with the         
invasion of Belgium.  For the German right, anyone even asking a ques-
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tion about the invasion of Belgium was a traitor.  Moreover, Germany’s 
defeat in World War I, they argued, resulted from a betrayal by the na-
tion’s liberals, who sought to topple the Kaiser and introduce democracy.  
Today, historians of modern Germany agree that this narrative was 
nonsensical. In fact in the waning days of World War I, Germany had 
become a de facto military dictatorship. Its democratic institutions were 
in shambles with no meaningful consequence for the conduct of the war.  
Why did Germany lose?  The defeat may be ascribed to the entry of the 
United States into the war, decisively tilting the balance.  It may be 
linked to technological innovations and access to critical resources.  It 
may persuasively be linked to tactical errors by the German General 
Staff.  Max Weber made a very convincing argument that a culture of 
crippling secrecy that enveloped the General Staff and the war cabinet 
had led to the entrenchment of mistakes and brought the country to de-
feat.  One thing that cannot be credibly argued is that Germany’s demo-
crats - a paltry group to start with - had anything meaningful to do with 
it.  Yet, the conservative counter-narrative, the “Stabbed-in-the-Back” 
argument (or, the Dolchstoßlegende in German) was politically potent 
and came to dominate the political discourse of the twenties, leading to 
the ultimate triumph of the German far-right and collapse of the Weimar 
Republic in 1933.  And in the years that followed, the political potency 
of the “Stabbed-in-the-Back” narrative was recognized and used around 
the world.  We can find it in the political discourse in France following 
the fiasco in Algeria, and in the United States after the Vietnam War, to 
cite just two instances.  Fake history can be very potent politics.   
So let us turn to the Guantánamo dilemma.  There are a number of 
competing narratives about Guantánamo.  One was advanced by the 
Bush Administration and is still put forward by Vice President Cheney.  
In this narrative, the country was sunk into a wholly unanticipated war as 
a result of the attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 9/11, 
which claimed nearly 3000 lives.  Adapting quickly to a new kind of 
warfare, the Administration saw the need to create a detention facility 
where the worst of the worst of the 9/11 terrorists could be held indefi-
nitely and used for intelligence gathering so that future attacks like 9/11 
could be thwarted.  As General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, said in a 2002 press conference, these individuals are the 
types of people who would “chew through the hydraulic brake cables of 
a jet to try to bring it down if not restrained in transportation.”  The 
people held at Guantánamo would be dyed-in-the-wool terrorists deter-
mined to kill Americans, and all the arrangements there would turn on 
one key consideration – i.e., the safety and security of American citizens.  
These special arrangements were necessary because of the weakness of 
our court system and criminal justice system, which allow the guilty to 
escape.  These same arrangements were also justified by our overriding 
need for intelligence, which would efficiently be collected from these 
terrorists in the Guantánamo setting.  Guantánamo was       innovative, 
and it was essential to American security.  Likewise, new tribunals 
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would be set up that would deal swiftly and efficiently with those 
charged.  They would not get the same benefits as legitimate prisoners of 
war or even defendants in an American courtroom.  Rather, they would 
get effective justice.  Remember, they are all terrorists and no one doubts 
their guilt. 
There is also an emerging alternative narrative.  The decision to 
create Guantánamo focused from the outset on the evasion of interna-
tional and U.S. law the Constitution and the criminal code books, and 
even the Uniform Code of Military Justice.  Certainly some of the pris-
oners held there were serious terrorists, but a far larger number, maybe 
80 percent of the inmate population, was not.  They were individuals 
caught up in a very loose dragnet that the Americans laid, or they were 
pure innocents, often sold by tribal chieftains and by            Pakistan’s 
notorious Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for payments that the Ameri-
cans offered.  The system operated with complete indifference to the 
guilt or innocence of those held there.  Moreover, the vilification of the 
prisoners in Guantánamo served the Administration’s domestic political 
objectives of spiking public fear from terrorism.  Guantánamo would al-
so be an experimentation chamber for new techniques designed to gather 
information by “breaking” the subject, with a focus on the    importation 
of techniques formerly used by U.S. enemies including the Soviet Union, 
Communist China, North Korea and North Vietnam.  These included wa-
ter boarding, long-time standing, hypothermia, sleep deprivation, sensory 
deprivation followed by sensory overload and prolonged isolation.  The 
government argued that these techniques would help it secure vital intel-
ligence, but in fact when torture techniques were applied, prisoners said 
whatever they suspected their interrogators wanted them to say.  The mil-
itary commissions were designed from the outset with two major objec-
tives:  the first was to insure convictions, and the second was to keep se-
cret the manner in which the prisoners were treated, and particularly the 
use of torture techniques. 
So which of these narratives is more faithful to the truth? That will 
be a judgment for historians to make, but we will never get to a reasoned 
assessment without some serious engagement with unpleasant facts.  At 
this point, the case for the official narrative looks very weak.  Let us just 
look at the most fundamental issue:  who were the prisoners?  Were they 
really the “worst of the worst?”  Today, it is reasonably clear that from 
the early days of the facility, certainly from mid-2002, the                 
Administration was told by intelligence experts that the prisoners held at 
Guantánamo were by and large not the ringleaders of Al Qaeda and the 
Taliban.  A handful were high-ranking members of the Al Qaeda or the 
Taliban, others were probably third or fourth-tier actors, and a much 
larger number, (probably a majority of the prisoners) were innocent 
people who never should have been incarcerated and who had only tan-
gential relations with the targeted terrorist groups.   
How do we know this?  Not from human rights attorneys or defense 
counsel. We know this from America’s most senior intelligence profes-
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sionals. Crack CIA counterterrorism experts had extensive opportunities 
to interrogate any Guantánamo prisoner they wanted to interrogate.  
They availed themselves of this.  Jane Mayer, in her book The Dark Side, 
recounts that in the summer of 2002, a CIA study based on careful re-
view of the Guantánamo detainees had concluded that fully one-third of 
the prison population had no connection to terrorism     whatsoever and 
that a majority of the balance had only a very tenuous connection.  The 
study’s authors called for a careful review and the release of a large 
number of prisoners. In the fall, a meeting was arranged between Nation-
al Security Council staffers who had reviewed the CIA report and Alber-
to Gonzales, the President’s personal lawyer.  Gonzales was flanked by 
David Addington, Dick Cheney’s confidant, and another White House 
lawyer, Tim Flanigan.  Addington delivered the following response: “No, 
there will be no review.  The president has determined that they are all 
enemy combatants. We are not going to revisit it.”  That was the end of 
the matter.   
But that was not all.  We now know through Freedom of               
Information Act disclosures that the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) also attempted a review and reconciliation of its interview notes in 
roughly the same period and reached conclusions identical to the CIA’s.  
The FBI also raised very serious concerns about the use of torture tech-
niques at Guantánamo and sought confirmation of guidance given preli-
minarily from senior FBI agents at Guantánamo not to participate in ses-
sions at which torture techniques were used.  These conclusions and a 
description of the torture techniques observed were passed to Director 
Robert Mueller, and then to the Assistant Attorney General responsible 
for the Criminal Division at the Justice Department, Michael Chertoff.  It 
got the same reaction, and it appears that Chertoff, in subsequent Con-
gressional testimony, falsified the essence of the briefing he got from the 
FBI, apparently to avoid any conflict with the position staked out by the 
White House. 
If the interrogation experts from the CIA and the FBI were saying 
that most of the prisoners were either innocent or at least not the serious 
figures America was trying to capture, why would political figures in the 
White House take a different position?  John Yoo often wields that ar-
gument. “Why,” he asks with a perverse sort of logic that reverses the 
proof burden, “would the Administration hold people who are innocent?” 
I think there is one feasible answer to that question:  a partisan political 
calculus.  The White House wanted to avoid the embarrassment of ac-
knowledging a mistake in the apprehension of terrorists, but it also saw 
valuable political benefit from the climate of fear that the terrorists, 
whose unshaven and menacing faces regularly flashed on American TV 
screens (especially Fox News), offered the President and his party.  In 
fact in the fall 2002 elections, just as Addington was saying no to the 
idea of a review of who was held at Guantánamo, the GOP scored      
impressive gains in Congress and in statehouses around the country.  The 
war on terror and support for the President’s handling of the war made 
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up almost the entire GOP campaign platform.  It was, in fact, very effec-
tive politics.  And in 2004, as Bush sought re-election, the GOP pursued 
the same angle, even as the force of arguments about the conduct of the 
war began to wear off.  A proper assessment of what happened cannot 
ignore the fact that in an electoral democracy, political actors measure 
their conduct to the perceived effect it will have on    elections.  Some-
times that helps assure obedience to the popular will. Other times, 
though, it leads to crass and demagogic conduct, as was the case with the 
Guantánamo prisoners.   
Nevertheless, there is more essential evidence for the view that a 
majority of the prisoners were innocent and that the mistakes made in the 
process can be traced right to the top.  First we have information col-
lected from Pakistan by intrepid journalists like Ahmed Rashid.  As he 
summarized in Descent into Chaos, Rashid learned from senior Pakistani 
sources, including some in the ISI, that by early 2002, the Pakistani gen-
erals who had built the Taliban and equivocally supported its alliance 
with Al Qaeda were focused on how to deal with American anger and 
resolve.  The generals believed that they needed to play a waiting game, 
offering just enough to the Americans to appease them and hold them at 
bay.  They would then be able to reenter Afghanistan and reestablish a 
government managed by their Taliban proxies. They quickly concluded 
that they could identify a “mark” in the Bush Administration - a key de-
cision-maker who was influential enough to shape policy and yet gullible 
enough to buy their very dubious bill of goods.  Their mark was Vice 
President Dick Cheney.   
Pakistan’s generals first tested this thesis in the early days of the 
Afghan war, in mid-November 2001.  U.S. forces and their allies on the 
ground had forced the Taliban and their Al Qaeda allies in the north to 
withdraw to the city of Kunduz, their last redoubt, where they were sur-
rounded and under siege.  ISI concluded that unless it acted quickly, the 
entire leadership of the Taliban and many of the leaders of Al Qaeda 
would be wiped out.  General Pervez Musharraf relayed an urgent appeal 
to the White House: “Give us a moratorium on bombing Kunduz and let 
us open an air corridor so we can get some military transports in to   
withdraw our Pakistani military attachés who are with the Taliban, so 
they won’t be killed.”  Cheney listened patiently to the request and gave 
the green light.  The bombardment of Kunduz ceased and Pakistan was 
able to land military transports there to evacuate key personnel. The key 
personnel evacuated did include some Pakistani advisors but also key 
leaders of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Rashid puts the number of eva-
cuated terrorist leaders at certainly hundreds, and perhaps as many as a 
thousand.  A flabbergasted American commander witnessing the whole 
scene dubbed it “Operation Evil Airlift.” Cheney insisted on top secret 
classification for the whole operation.  Even other cabinet members were 
not briefed about it.  
The Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders whose capture was a top priority, 
the people for whom Guantánamo was being built, were evacuated away 
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to safety right under the nose of the U.S. forces, courtesy of Dick Che-
ney. (pp. 91-93, a similar account by Seymour Hersh appeared in _The 
New Yorker_). The ISI squirreled them away quickly in a number of dif-
ferent locations in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province and in Balu-
chistan.  
ISI leadership also appreciated the Bush Administration’s need to 
claim it had captured key players, and indeed this was the price of con-
tinued good relations with the United States.  Payment came not just in 
the form of bounty fees paid over to the Pakistani military, but also in 
roughly $10 billion in aid, most of which went to the Pakistani military 
in an untraceable form.  The ISI decided, Rashid notes, to be sure that the 
Americans got bodies, but it insured that they would be nobodies.  While 
Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders were being sheltered, the Pakistanis turned 
over to the Americans stray Arab tourists, taxi drivers, shepherds and 
others who got in their way.  They bragged about helping Americans 
snag key players, but in fact they were doing just the opposite, comforta-
ble all along that the Americans were simply too gullible to know the dif-
ference.   
In the key period of 2002-03, when the U.S. should have been cap-
turing Osama bin Laden, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Mullah Omar and other 
Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders, instead it was collecting innocents and 
people with marginal connections and proclaiming them the “worst of 
the worst.”  The intensive rhetoric was necessary in fact to cover for the 
failure of U.S. efforts to get its targets, a failure that resulted from gross 
incompetence in the White House. 
The real disclosure of these wretched facts, however, had to wait for 
at least three more years.  Notably, it came neither through the investiga-
tive work of a congressional committee (congressional oversight failed 
almost totally during this period) nor through the work of some exposé 
journalists.  Instead, it came through the work of law students and their 
professors, people just like you in the audience today, just across the 
Hudson River at Seton Hall University in New Jersey.  They issued a se-
ries of impressive reports, with the first and most significant being “A 
Profile of 517 Detainees through Analysis of      Department of Defense 
Data” published on February 8, 2006.  The report established that very 
few of the Guantánamo prisoners had been captured by Americans; most 
had been turned over by bounty hunters out for a fee or by Pakistani au-
thorities.  A second report followed in March, noting that prisoners were 
being classified as terrorists based on their affiliations with organizations 
which were not, in fact, scheduled terrorist              organizations.  This 
second report suggested either that members of terrorist organizations 
were being let into the country without control (because of the absence of 
these organizations from the No Fly List) or that the prisoners were not 
in fact members of terrorist organizations.  That final conclusion is the 
clearly more compelling one. A third report from July 2006, followed by 
another in August 2006, looked at suicide and self-harm incidents, pro-
viding another grim look at conditions at the camp, and prompting some 
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of the most absurd rebuttals from the    Rumsfeld Pentagon.  Subsequent 
reports looked at the Combat Status Review Tribunals and demonstrated 
conclusively that they had been used abusively to reverse determinations 
by Military Commissions that prisoners were not enemy combatants; at 
the “urban legend” propagated by the Pentagon and by figures like Jus-
tice Scalia about recidivism from released Guantánamo prisoners. It fol-
lows from these studies that for roughly 80 percent of the prisoners there 
is little evidence to support Government claims that the individual is a 
terrorist or a member of Al Qaeda or the Taliban. 
The Seton Hall reports were harshly attacked by the Rumsfeld Pen-
tagon and by its associated media, particularly Fox News.  However, we 
are now close to the point of being able to say definitively that the re-
ports are not only accurate on their face, but also offer a solid indicator 
of how a fair court would resolve these cases. 
We can say this on the basis of habeas corpus cases processed to 
date.  A total of thirty eight cases have now gone through the federal   
district court level with final determinations.  All cases went to district 
court judges in the District of Columbia, which may be the single most 
conservative trial bench in the United States.  All of the judges hearing 
these cases were Republican nominees and several of them were         
appointed by George W. Bush.  In thirty cases, the court concluded that 
the government did not have an adequate basis to justify the prisoner’s 
detention, even on the sharply reduced standard of habeas corpus.  In just 
eight cases was the government able to make out a sufficient case to jus-
tify continued detention.  The prisoner’s habeas corpus success rate 
matches the Seton Hall study.  Notably, this followed three years of 
steady wind-down of the population at Guantánamo and involved cases 
where the government was convinced it has a solid case. In other words, 
even accepting the Seton Hall numbers, we could have expected a better 
performance for the government.     
I want to dig a bit into one case, which seems to exemplify what we 
have learned through the habeas process.  It involves a Kuwaiti national 
named Fouad al-Rabiah.  It was decided at the end of September by 
Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, a no-nonsense conservative Reagan ap-
pointee.  The prosecutors called al-Rabiah a terrorist, but for the defense 
he was a Kuwaiti Airlines manager stuck at the wrong place and the 
wrong time.  Judge Kollar-Kotelly reviewed the evidence and had no dif-
ficulty making the ruling.  Al-Rabiah was to be released “forthwith.”  
There was no basis for his detention.  The judge was disturbed by the 
way he was treated in Guantánamo, even though she is precluded by se-
curity classifications from describing it in public documents.  
Al-Rabiah had been examined with care by a CIA agent shortly af-
ter his arrival in Guantánamo.  The conclusion: this is an innocent man 
who should not be held.  
Government officials, lacking any evidence to justify the detention 
of a man who was almost certainly innocent, decided they needed some-
thing to justify his detention.  The government insists that no torture was 
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involved.  What was done to al-Rabiah remains super-secret, and the in-
terests of national security preclude its disclosure.  Nevertheless, pro-
longed sleep deprivation, and isolation, the use of extreme heat and cold, 
short-shackling in painful stress positions, forced nudity, forced groom-
ing, religious and sexual humiliation, and the use of loud music and noise 
were all part of the standard operating procedure at Guantánamo. Admit-
tedly, they would have been applied in combination on a prisoner like al-
Rabiah with the objective of “breaking” him and securing false testimo-
ny. 
Under such treatment, al-Rabiah proceeded to confess to every act 
the prosecutors needed for their case.  The judge concluded that the con-
fessions were “entirely incredible” and that the government’s case 
against al-Rabiah rested on a series of almost absurd contentions that had 
no basis other than the torture-induced confessions (The judge avoids use 
of the word “torture.” She focuses only on credibility.) Although “al-
Rabiah’s interrogators ultimately extracted confessions from him,” she 
writes, they themselves “never believed his confessions based on the 
comments they included in their interrogation reports.”  The judge pulled 
this piece from the transcript of one of al-Rabiah’s interrogations.  The 
interrogator states: There is nothing against you. But there is no innocent 
person here. So, you should confess to something so you can be charged 
and sentenced and serve your sentence and then go back to your family 
and country, because you will not leave this place innocent. 
As Hannah Arendt said, the modern political liar will use all the 
power he has to make his lies into the truth.  Here, we see a clear demon-
stration of that principle.  Al-Rabiah was tortured to extract confessions 
that would make him out to be a terrorist, even though he was not one.  
The same sure and nauseating logic that drove the show trials of the thir-
ties and early fifties was in charge in Guantánamo.  The difference was 
the integrity of the military, FBI and CIA interrogators, who clearly and 
repeatedly noted that they did not believe the             confessions, and the 
integrity of the courts, which have been able to ferret out and reject tor-
ture-tainted evidence. 
This long review of how we got to Guantánamo is important for 
several reasons.  It helps us understand why the Bush White House be-
fore, and Dick Cheney today, have been so vehement in their rhetoric 
about Guantánamo.  They made gross mistakes and they have a lot to 
cover up. The essence of the Guantánamo story is that the Administration 
failed in its principal objective of seizing and holding the “worst of the 
worst” Al Qaeda terrorists who remain at large.  Rather than accept that 
fact and release the innocent, they resolved to use all the tools at their 
disposal to make the prisoners at Guantánamo into the “worst of the 
worst.”  
This review also helps us understand why a perfectly reasonable so-
lution will entail releasing a very large part of the prisoners.   
We are now down to the last two weeks before release of the task 
force report. What is going to come?   
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First, the Obama Administration is putting a stress on identifying 
the major cases in which solid evidence exists of serious criminal 
wrongdoing.  These cases will be brought in federal courts, probably 
most of them in the Southern District of New York.  This will include 
cases which previously were being prepared in the Military Commissions 
with charges like material support and attempted homicide on a member 
of the U.S. armed forces.  The death penalty will be sought in the most 
serious of these cases. 
Second, the Military Commissions will continue, and cases based 
on straightforward violations of the laws of armed conflict will be re-
ferred to them.  That is theoretical. As best I can see from reviewing the 
cases about which something is known, I have not identified a single one 
which is appropriate for trial before a military commission.  The AP is 
reporting this morning that there will be five such cases, including Abd 
al-Rahim al-Nashiri, the alleged bomber of the USS Cole, but let us wait 
to see what charges result before judging this effort.  Some civil           
libertarians will reflexively object to any use of the military commissions 
and will call them kangaroo courts.  The evidence now shows that the 
Bush Administration did attempt to turn the commissions into kangaroo 
courts.  It also shows that the military judges, prosecutors and defense 
counsel who drive the system resisted this effort, often valiantly and at 
the expense of their own careers.  There is no reason why commissions, 
properly constituted, cannot produce results every bit as fair as the feder-
al courts.  A recent study by NYU Law School's Center on Law and Se-
curity shows that they are actually a more favorable forum for defendants 
than federal criminal courts, which is another reason why a prosecutor 
would want to steer the more serious cases into court.  
Third, the process of returning Guantánamo prisoners to their home 
countries or another suitable location will continue.  This effort will fo-
cus on prisoners who are either innocent or at least “not so guilty.”  In 
other words, there may be some information suggesting a connection to 
terrorist groups that are not considered major risks or are of no particular 
concern to the United States.  The biggest group in this batch consists of 
the Yemenis, and I expect an arrangement will be made to return them to 
Yemen notwithstanding U.S. queasiness about the intentions of the Ye-
meni government.  Notwithstanding the rhetorical differences between 
the Obama and Bush Administrations, this actually presents a point of 
strong continuity. The process of returning Yemeni detainees to their na-
tive land commenced under Bush in 2006. Obama is simply carrying it 
forward. 
Fourth, the habeas corpus process will continue, and the             
government will implement the decisions of the courts, taking appeals 
when appropriate. 
Much discussion has focused on a so-called fifth case, consisting of 
individuals who “we know are guilty” but we feel we cannot charge for 
paucity of evidence or concern about exposure of intelligence sources 
and methods in the process.  Elaborate efforts were prepared to create a 
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regime of preventive detention to cover this group.  I am pleased to note 
that the Obama Administration appears to have now rejected the          
preventive detention approach.  What are the alternatives? 
I am skeptical about this “fifth category.”  In particular, if we “know 
they are guilty,” I believe a way can be found to charge and try them.  
The NYU Law School study I just mentioned shows that the Bush Ad-
ministration actually amassed a strong track record in charging counter-
terrorism cases and obtaining convictions in cases in which there was on-
ly scant evidence of connection to terrorist organizations.  Moreover, 
James Benjamin’s study, which he discussed this morning, has complete-
ly demolished the Bush Administration’s arguments to the effect that 
federal criminal proceedings cannot serve the needs of prosecutors.  Over 
the course of the last four years, I have repeatedly been taken aside by 
government figures and told “if you knew what we knew about Mr. X, 
you wouldn’t be raising questions about this case.  He’s guilty, even 
though we have some problems with this case.”  Well, one of those cases 
was Fouad al-Rabiah.  I am convinced at this point that many of those 
tough cases, where they’re sure of guilt but the evidence just doesn’t 
work, actually involve people who are innocent, and often enough people 
who were tortured, and where evidence of torture will complicate the tri-
al.  Moreover, a system which guarantees that the government wins 
every case has nothing to do with justice.  Consequently, I doubt that this 
“fifth category” actually exists.  Even without a special proposal by the 
Obama Administration for preventive detention measures, it has some 
options to continue to hold persons who are not tried, and even persons 
who are tried and acquitted. If it has evidence that they are enemy com-
batants, it can, for instance, hold them under the laws of armed conflict 
until the hostilities have ceased. 
The loudest voice on the national stage right now on the            
Guantánamo issue is Dick Cheney’s.  The wisest voices, however, have 
been roughly two dozen retired generals and admirals who assembled in 
Washington a month ago where General Harry Soyster, the longtime 
head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said that “Barack Obama 
should make good on his promise,” Guantánamo has been a recruiting 
poster for terrorist organizations, and it has been a stain on the good   
reputation of the American military.  It was established by violently sub-
verting two centuries of American military doctrine.  The best course 
now is to wipe it away as quickly as possible.  My friend Admiral John 
Hutson offered another vital comment.  No one doubts that there are a 
few dozen serious terrorists at Guantánamo.  It serves the interests of the 
United States and the interests of justice for these individuals to be 
quickly charged for the crimes they committed, if possible in federal 
courts and, if not, before military commissions, for convincing evidence 
to be brought forward and for their guilt to be swiftly established. Noth-
ing is more important right now than for the Obama Administration to 
renew America’s commitment to justice.  That means releasing the inno-
cent, but it also means securing the conviction and sentencing of the 
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guilty through a process that embraces our fundamental values. 
 
 
